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Market Selection and Survival of Investment
Strategies
Rabah Amir a, Igor V. Evstigneevb, Thorsten Hens c and
Klaus Reiner Schenk–Hoppe´d
Abstract
The paper analyzes the process of market selection of investment
strategies in an incomplete asset market. The payoffs of the as-
sets depend on random factors described in terms of a discrete-time
Markov process. Market participants make dynamic investment de-
cisions based on their observations and time. We show that a trader
distributing wealth across available assets according to the relative
expected returns eventually accumulates the entire market wealth.
The result obtains under the assumption that the trader’s strategy
is asymptotically distinct from the CAPM strategy (prescribing in-
vestment in the market portfolio). This assumption turns out to be
essentially necessary for the conclusion.
JEL-Classification: D52, D81, D83, G11.
Keywords: evolutionary finance, portfolio theory, investment strategies, CAPM,
market selection, incomplete markets.
1 Introduction
The purpose of the paper is to develop an evolutionary approach to the
study of investment strategies in financial markets. It has long been ar-
gued (Alchian 1950, Cootner 1964, Fama 1965) that market pressures would
eventually select those traders who are better adapted to the prevailing con-
ditions. According to the standard paradigm of economic theory, agents
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maximize preferences or utilities. From the evolutionary point of view, what
matters is not the utility level, but the chances of survival. The evolutionary
principle leads to the consideration of the process of economic natural selec-
tion among the market participants (or among the strategies of behavior they
adopt). This view, in comparison with the implications of utility or profit
maximizing behavior, has been discussed in the context of financial market
modelling by Blume and Easley (1992, 2001), Sandroni (2000), and others.
The approach pursued in the present work combines ideas from economic
theory and finance. We examine the process of market selection in the frame-
work of incomplete markets with traders that can dynamically update their
investment strategies. While retaining a market-clearing mechanism that
determines prices endogenously in every period, we depart from individual
utility maximization. We assume that each trader follows a portfolio rule,
specifying a distribution of wealth across the available assets for any moment
of time and for any history of events. Trading strategies are compared with
each other in terms of their abilities to survive under market selection in
the long run (rather than in the conventional terms of discounted values).
The model allows to include various types of agents’ strategies, e.g., those
motivated by behavioral finance (Shleifer 2000).
We analyze the global dynamics of the distribution of wealth across
investors—each employing an individual portfolio rule—in a market with
short-lived assets. The assets are in positive supply and their payoffs de-
pend on the realization of an exogenous state of the world that is described
in terms of a homogeneous finite-state Markov chain. Short sales are ruled
out. In the case where only a complete set of Arrow securities is traded and
the states of the world are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.),
our model reduces to the one proposed in the seminal paper by Blume and
Easley (1992). We regard the model as being of interest from the applied
perspective of financial markets as well as being theoretically sound.
The main result of our paper is that, in any—complete or incomplete—
market for short-lived assets, there is one specific portfolio rule, denoted by
λ∗, such that a trader following the rule eventually accumulates the entire
market wealth. This result requires an asymptotic condition on the distance
between the trader’s strategy based on λ∗ and the CAPM rule. The latter
prescribes investing into the market portfolio1. A trader using the CAPM
rule keeps a constant fraction of the market wealth. Therefore she can neither
accumulate the entire market wealth nor be driven out by the other investors.
1This investment rule is suggested by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and
Tobin’s mutual fund theorem—see, e.g., Magill and Quinzii (1996, Theorem 17.3 and
Proposition 16.15).
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Investing into the market portfolio means mimicking the “average” portfolio.
We prove that the λ∗-trader gathers market wealth at an exponential rate
if λ∗ is bounded away from the CAPM rule for sufficiently many periods
of time. More precisely, we impose the following condition: there exists a
random number κ > 0 such that, almost surely, the distance between λ∗ and
the CAPM rule is greater than κ in nt periods during every time-horizon of
length t, where lim inft→∞ nt/t > 0. Remarkably, this condition turns out to
be not only sufficient but also necessary for the validity of the above assertion
(see Theorem 3 in Section 3).
Our result shows that a λ∗-trader survives the market selection process
regardless of the initial distribution of wealth among the traders. The port-
folio rule λ∗ is of appealing simplicity: it is very easy to compute. The rule
λ∗ requires a trader to distribute wealth across assets in accordance with
the relative conditional expected returns of each asset. The result implies a
simple valuation formula for the assets traded. In the limit, the price of each
asset is determined by the risk-neutral valuation of its payoffs.
The principle underlying the rule λ∗ has been known and established in
various contexts since the work of Kelly (1956) and Breiman (1961), whose
studies were motivated, basically, by gambling models. This principle—in
financial interpretation—prescribes that the investments should be propor-
tional to the expected returns. If the outcomes are zero-one (win or lose),
then the optimal strategy reduces to distributing investments according to
the probabilities of the positive outcomes (“betting one’s beliefs”). Kelly
(1956) and Breiman (1961) have shown that this principle leads to the maxi-
mization of the expected logarithm of the growth rate. This idea gave rise to
a large area of research—see, e.g., Thorp (1971), Algoet and Cover (1988),
Hakansson and Ziemba (1995). Apparently, the important paper by Rad-
ner (1971) was the first where this idea was systematically developed in the
context of economic theory. Radner applied it to the study of a stochastic
analogue of the von Neumann–Gale model of economic growth (see, e.g.,
Arkin and Evstigneev (1987)).
Blume and Easley (1992) considered a model of a complete asset mar-
ket with endogenous prices, simple (constant) trading strategies and i.i.d.
states of the world. They have shown that, in order to be a single survivor
in the market selection process, a trader should follow the rule of “betting
one’s beliefs.” To find this rule it suffices to solve the maximization problem
for the expected logarithm of a (properly defined) individual growth rate.
Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2001) extended the Blume–Easley ap-
proach to an incomplete market model with simple trading strategies and
i.i.d. states of the world (see also Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2001), where
local dynamics of the process were studied). In that context, the problem
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of characterizing a single survivor cannot generally be reduced to individual
optimization.
The present work continues this line of studies and makes progress in the
following two directions. Firstly, we consider general, not necessarily sim-
ple, strategies, which substantially enlarges the area of applicability of the
results. Secondly, we abandon the assumption of independence of the under-
lying random parameters. Rather, we assume that the underlying process,
describing the states of the world, is Markov. Therefore our main result is
formulated in terms of conditional (rather than unconditional) expectations
of relative returns.
Although our result is complete within the present framework, there are
certainly many desirable extensions of the model. One can mention, for in-
stance, long-lived assets, changes in the market structure, endogenous asset
supply, and variations of the investment-consumption ratio. These general-
izations are left to future research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. The
main results are presented in Section 3. All the proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
2 Model
Let S be a finite set and st, t = 0, 1, 2, ..., a homogeneous Markov chain with
transition function p(σ|s), specifying the conditional probabilities P{st+1 =
σ| st = s}. The random variable st describes the “state of the world” at
time t. There are K assets that live one period but are identically reborn at
every subsequent period. One unit of asset k issued at time t yields return
Ak(st+1, st) ≥ 0 at time t + 1. We assume
K∑
k=1
Ak(σ, s) > 0 (1)
for all σ, s ∈ S.
There are I investors (traders) i = 1, ..., I acting on the market. Every
investor i at each time t = 0, 1, 2, ... selects a portfolio
hit = (h
i
1,t, ..., h
i
K,t),
where hik,t is the number of units of asset k in the portfolio h
i
t. Generally, h
i
t
depends on the history st = (s0, ..., st) of the process st up to time t:
hit = h
i
t(s
t)
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(we will often omit the argument st when this does not lead to ambiguity).
For each t ≥ 1, k and st, we have
I∑
i=1
hik,t(s
t) = Vk(st) (2)
where Vk(st) is the trading volume of asset k at time t ≥ 0 in the random
situation st. The functions Vk(s) > 0 of s ∈ S (k = 1, ..., K) are exogenously
given in the model.
If investor i possesses a portfolio hit = (h
i
k,t) at time t ≥ 0, then her wealth
wit+1 at time t + 1 can be expressed as
wit+1 =
K∑
k=1
Ak(st+1, st)h
i
k,t.
For every i, a strictly positive number wi0 is given—the initial wealth of
investor i. In view of (2), we have
I∑
i=1
wit+1 =
K∑
k=1
Ak(st+1, st)Vk(st), t ≥ 0. (3)
The variable
wt =
I∑
i=1
wit,
specifies the aggregate market wealth at time t ≥ 0.
It is assumed that every investor i selects a portfolio by using the following
procedure. He/she chooses an investment strategy—a sequence of functions
λit = (λ
i
1,t, ...,λ
i
K,t), λ
i
t = λ
i
t(s
t), t ≥ 0, (4)
such that
λik,t > 0,
K∑
k=1
λik,t = 1, (5)
and assigns the share λik,t of her budget w
i
t for purchasing asset k at time t.
Given every investor i has chosen a strategy (λik,t), the equation
ρk,t =
1
Vk(st)
I∑
i=1
λik,t w
i
t
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determines the market clearing price ρk,t = ρk,t(st) of asset k at any time
t ≥ 0. Then the portfolio hit of investor i can be expressed as follows
hik,t =
λik,t w
i
t
ρk,t
, t ≥ 0.
From the last and the previous equations, we find
hik,t = Vk(st)
λik,t w
i
t∑I
j=1 λ
j
k,t w
j
t
. (6)
This leads to the following formula expressing the wealth wit+1 of investors
i = 1, 2, ..., I at time t + 1 through their wealth at time t:
wit+1 =
K∑
k=1
Ak(st+1, st)Vk(st)
λik,t w
i
t∑I
j=1 λ
j
k,t w
j
t
. (7)
Since wi0 > 0, we obtain by way of induction that w
i
t > 0 for each t (see (1)
and (5)). From this we conclude that the evolution of the relative market
shares of the investors,
rit =
wit
wt
,
is governed by the equations
rit+1 =
K∑
k=1
Rk(st+1, st)
λik,t r
i
t∑I
j=1 λ
j
k,t r
j
t
, i = 1, ..., I, (8)
where
Rk(st+1, st) =
Ak(st+1, st)Vk(st)∑K
m=1 Am(st+1, st)Vm(st)
.
The numbers Rk(st+1, st) characterize the relative (normalized) payoffs of
the assets k = 1, 2, ..., K. We have Rk(st+1, st) ≥ 0 and
K∑
k=1
Rk(st+1, st) = 1. (9)
The main focus of this work is on the analysis of the evolution of the
relative market shares rit depending on the choice of the strategies λ
i
t, i =
1, 2, ..., I. We are interested primarily in those strategies which allow an
investor to survive, i.e., to keep a positive relative market share in the limit,
and, moreover, which allow the investor to dominate the market, i.e., to
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gather in the limit all the market wealth. A central role is played by the
following notion. We say that an investor i (or the strategy λi = (λik,t)) is a
single survivor in the selection process (8) if
lim rit = 1 (10)
almost surely (a.s.). Condition (10) implies lim rjt = 0 a.s. for all j #= i,
which means that, in the limit, investor i accumulates all the market wealth.
If the sequence rit involved in (10) converges to 1 at an exponential rate, we
shall say that the strategy λi dominates the others exponentially.
It is an important problem to identify those strategies which enable an
investor using them to become a single survivor. Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´
(2001) and Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2001) considered this prob-
lem within two different settings (local and global, respectively). The latter
paper focused on a special case of the model at hand, where (i) the random
variables st are independent and identically distributed; (ii) the functions
Ak (and hence Rk) depend only on st+1; (iii) Vk(s) ≡ 1; and (iv) the anal-
ysis is restricted to the consideration of only simple strategies λi = (λik,t),
i.e., those for which the budget shares λik,t(s
t) do not depend on t and st.
For that model, the following result was obtained (Evstigneev, Hens, and
Schenk-Hoppe´ 2001, Theorem 1).
Theorem 1 Let the expected values R∗k = ERk(st) be strictly positive and let
the functions R1(s), ..., RK(s) of s ∈ S be linearly independent (the absence
of redundant assets). Let one of the investors i = 1, ..., I, say i = 1, use the
simple strategy λ1 = (λ1k) defined by
λ1k = R
∗
k, (11)
whereas all the other investors i #= 1 use different simple strategies λi #= λ1.
Then investor 1 is a single survivor in the market selection process (8).
This theorem generalizes the result of Blume and Easley (1992), dealing
with the case of Arrow securities (S = {1, 2, ..., K}, Ak(s) = 0 if s #= k and
Ak(s) = 1 if s = k). Furthermore, the strategy (11) defined in terms of
the expected payoffs may be regarded as a development of the Kelly rule
of “betting one’s beliefs” (Kelly 1956). This rule was originally designed in
connection with gambling problems, but later on it was successfully employed
in portfolio theory (Thorp 1971, Aurell, Baviera, Hammarlid, Serva, and
Vulpiani 2000).
In this work, we intend to obtain versions of Theorem 1 applicable to the
more general model we have described in the present section. What is most
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essential in this generalization is that we are going to leave the framework of
simple strategies and allow the investors to employ strategies using informa-
tion about the history of the process st—see the definition in (4) and (5). In
this context, we can define a strategy λ∗ of “betting one’s beliefs”—a direct
analogue of the one considered in Theorem 1. As it turns out, we cannot,
generally, guarantee λ∗ to be a single survivor. Nevertheless, we show that
this conclusion does obtain under a natural sufficient condition, having a
clear economic meaning. We also provide a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for an investor using the strategy λ∗ to be a single survivor dominating
the others exponentially. Precise statements of the results are given in the
next section.
3 Results
Consider the random dynamical system (8) describing the evolution of the
relative market shares rit(s
t) of the investors i = 1, 2, ..., I. Note that if
rt = (rit) is a strictly positive vector, then, as is easily seen from (5), (8) and
(9), rt+1 is a strictly positive vector as well. Thus rt = rt(st) is a random
process with values in the relative interior ∆I+ of the unit simplex
∆I = {x = (x1, ..., xI) ∈ RI : xi ≥ 0,
∑
xi = 1}.
The initial state r0 = (r10, ..., r
I
0) ∈ ∆I+, from which this process starts, is
fixed (ri0 = w
i
0/
∑
wj0).
We will analyze the above random dynamical system under the following
assumptions.
(A.1) The functions
R∗k(s) :=
∑
σ∈S
p(σ|s)Rk(σ, s), k = 1, 2, ..., K, (12)
take on strictly positive values for each s ∈ S.
(A.2) For every s ∈ S, the functions R1(·, s), ..., RK(·, s) restricted to the
set
Π(s) = {σ ∈ S : p(σ|s) > 0}
are linearly independent.
According to (A.1), the conditional expectation
R∗k(s) = E[Rk(st+1, st) | st = s] (13)
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of the relative payoff Rk(st+1, st) of every asset k given st = s is strictly
positive at each state s. Hypothesis (A.2) means the absence of condition-
ally redundant assets. The term “conditionally” refers to the fact that the
functions Rk(·, s), k = 1, ..., K, are linearly independent on the set Π(s)—the
support of the conditional distribution p(σ|s).
In what follows, we will restrict attention to those investment strategies
λ = (λk,t) that satisfy the following additional assumption.
(B) The coordinates λk,t(st) of the vectors λt(st) are bounded away from
zero by a strictly positive non-random constant ρ (which might depend on the
strategy λ, but not on k, t and st).
In (5), we included in the definition of a strategy the condition λk,t > 0
(such strategies are sometimes termed completely mixed). Assumption (B)
contains the additional requirement of uniform strict positivity of λk,t.
A key role in our analysis will be played by the strategy λ∗ = (λ∗k,t(st))
defined according to the formula
λ∗k,t(st) = R
∗
k(st), (14)
where R∗k(s) is the conditional expectation of Rk(st+1, st) given st = s (see
(12) and (13)). This is the strategy of “betting one’s beliefs,” which takes on,
in the case of independent identically distributed variables st, the form (11).
Note that λ∗k(st) = λ
∗
k,t(st) does not explicitly depend on t, and, furthermore,
λ∗k(st) is a function of only the current state st of the process (st), rather than
the whole history st of it. This implies, by virtue of (A.1) and in view of
finiteness of S, that the strategy λ∗ satisfies condition (B).
To proceed further, we need to describe a recursive method of constructing
strategies based on (Markovian) decision rules. Suppose one of the traders,
say 1, has a privilege of making her investment decision at time t with full
information about the current market structure rt and the actions λ2t (s
t),
λ3t (s
t), ...,λIt (s
t) that have just been undertaken by all the other traders
2, 3, ..., I. Formally, the decision of investor 1 is specified by a function
ft(r, l
2, ..., lI), r ∈ ∆I+, lj ∈ ∆K+ (j = 2, 3, ..., K)
taking values in ∆K+ . Suppose such functions—decision rules—are given for
all t = 0, 1, 2, .... Furthermore, suppose investors 2, ..., I have chosen some
strategies λ2t , ...,λ
I
t (t = 0, 1, 2, ...). Then we can construct a strategy λ
1
t (s
t),
t = 0, 1, ..., of investor 1 by using the formula
λ1t (s
t) = ft(rt,λ
2
t , ...,λ
I
t ), (15)
where rt = rt(st) and λ
j
t = λ
j
t(s
t), j = 2, ..., I.
9
Let us consider a particular decision rule f = (f1, ..., fK) (which does not
explicitly depend on t) defined by
f(r, l2, ..., lI) =
I∑
j=2
rj
1− r1 l
j. (16)
Here r = (r1, ..., rI) ∈ ∆I+, lj = (lj1, ..., ljK) ∈ ∆K+ , and so the vector f =
(f1, ..., fK) belongs to ∆K+ . Note that the vector f is a convex combination of
the vectors l2, ..., lI with weights rj(1−r1)−1. This implies, in particular, the
following: if the coordinates ljk of the vectors l
j are bounded away from 0 by
a constant ρ > 0, then the coordinates fk of f are bounded away from 0 by
the same constant. Consequently, if the strategies λ2t ,...,λ
I
t satisfy condition
(B), the strategy (15) satisfies condition (B) as well. In what follows, we will
use the notation f = (fk) for the particular decision rule described in (16).
The decision rule (16) has a number of remarkable properties. First of
all, observe the following. Suppose investor 1 employs the strategy λ1t (s
t)
defined by (15) in terms of the decision rule (16). Then we have
λ1k,t =
I∑
j=1
λjk,t r
j
t , (17)
which, in view of (8), yields
r1t+1 = r
1
t .
Thus, if investor 1 uses the strategy generated by the decision rule (16), then
(regardless of what strategies are used by the others!) the relative market
share of this investor remains constant over time. This observation leads to
the following conclusion. If one of the traders 2, ..., I uses the strategy λ∗,
she cannot be a single survivor, as long as trader 1 uses the strategy (15)
and, consequently, keeps a constant positive market share r1t = r
1
0 for all t.
Further, we can see that the portfolio of investor 1, who uses the strategy
λ1t defined in terms of the decision rule (16), is given by
h1k,t = Vk(st)
λ1k,t, w
1
t∑I
j=1 λ
j
k,t w
j
t
= Vk(st)
λ1k,t r
1
t∑I
j=1 λ
j
k,t r
j
t
= Vk(st) r
1
t ,
for all k = 1, 2, ..., K (see (6) and (17)). Thus the vector h1t = (h
1
1,t, ..., h
1
K,t)
turns out to be proportional to the market portfolio, i.e., the vector
(V1(st), ..., Vk(st)),
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whose components indicate the amounts of assets k = 1, 2, ..., K currently
traded at the market. According to the well-known Tobin mutual fund the-
orem (Magill and Quinzii 1996, Proposition 16.15), portfolios having this
structure result from the mean-variance optimization in the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM). Therefore it is natural to term the decision rule
(16) the CAPM decision rule and the strategy generated by it the CAPM
strategy. The CAPM decision rule plays a key role in the formulation of the
main results below.
In Theorem 2 below, we describe a condition sufficient for the strategy
(14) to be a single survivor. We consider the dynamical system (8), assuming
that the investors i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I} use some strategies λi = (λit) satisfying
requirement (B). We define
ζt = (ζ1,t, ..., ζK,t) = f(rt,λ
2
t , ...,λ
I
t ),
where f is the CAPM decision rule. The symbol | · | denotes the sum of the
absolute values of the coordinates of a finite-dimensional vector.
Theorem 2 Let investor 1 use the strategy λ1 = λ∗ defined by (14). Let the
following condition be fulfilled:
(C) With probability 1, we have
lim inf
t→∞
|λ∗(st)− ζt| > 0. (18)
Then investor 1 is a single survivor, and, moreover,
lim inf
t→∞
1
t
ln
r1t
1− r1t
> 0 (19)
almost surely.
Property (19) means that the relative market share of investor 1 tends
to one at an exponential rate, whereas the relative market shares of all the
other investors vanish at such rates, and so the strategy λ∗ dominates the
others exponentially.
Condition (C) can be restated as follows: there exists a strictly positive
random variable κ such that, almost surely,
|λ∗(st)− ζt(st)| ≥ κ (20)
for all t large enough. The last inequality requires that the actions λ∗(st)
prescribed by the strategy λ∗ should differ by not less than κ > 0 from the
actions
ζt(s
t) = (ζ1,t(s
t), ..., ζK,t(s
t)), ζk,t(s
t) =
I∑
j=2
rjt (s
t)
1− r1t (st)
λjk,t(s
t),
11
prescribed by the CAPM decision rule. Here, we do not assume that any
of the market actors indeed employ the CAPM rule; we need it only as an
indicator, a proper deviation of which from λ∗ guarantees λ∗ to be a single
survivor.
In concrete instances, it might not be easy to verify condition (C) directly.
Therefore we provide another hypothesis, (C.1), which is stronger than (C)
but can conveniently be checked in various examples.
(C.1) There exists a strictly positive random variable κ such that, with
probability 1, the distance between the vector λ∗(st) ∈ RK and the convex hull
of the vectors λ2t (s
t), ..., λIt (s
t) ∈ RK is not less than κ for all t large enough.
Clearly (C.1) implies (C) because ζt = f(rt,λ2t , ...,λ
I
t ) is a convex combi-
nation of λ2t , ...,λ
I
t .
Condition (C), which is sufficient for investor i to be a single survivor,
turns out to be close to a necessary one. The theorem below provides a
version of hypothesis (C) that is necessary and sufficient for the conclusion
of Theorem 2 to hold.
Theorem 3 Investor 1 using the strategy (14) is a single survivor in the
market selection process, and, moreover, dominates the others exponentially,
if and only if the following condition is fulfilled:
(C.2) There exists a random variable κ > 0 such that
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
#
{
t ∈ {0, ..., T} : |λ∗(st)− ζt(st)| ≥ κ
}
> 0 (21)
with probability 1.
The symbol # in the above formula stands for the number of elements in
a finite set.
Observe that (C.2) follows from (C). Indeed, (C) is equivalent to the
existence of a random variable κ for which, almost surely, inequality (20) is
fulfilled for all t large enough. In this case, the limit in (21) is equal to 1. The
limit in (21) may be thought of as a density (in the set of natural numbers)
of those natural numbers t for which inequality (20) holds. Hypothesis (C.2)
only requires this density to be strictly positive, whereas (C) says that (20)
should hold from some t on.
Let us return to Theorem 2. From this theorem, it follows immediately
that if the relation
lim inf
t→∞
1
t
ln
r1t
1− r1t
≤ 0, (22)
holds with positive probability, then, with positive probability, there exists
a (random) sequence tk such that
|λ∗(stk)− ζtk(stk)|→ 0. (23)
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Can we make a stronger statement about convergence in (23) if we strengthen
(22) appropriately? A result along these lines is provided by the next theo-
rem.
Theorem 4 Let the following condition be satisfied:
(D.1) There exists a random variable 0 < γ < 1 such that E ln γ > −∞ and
r1t < 1− γ
a.s. for all t.
Then we have
|λ∗(st)− ζt|→ 0 a.s.
We will actually prove Theorem 4 under a weaker assumption:
(D.2) The expectations
E[ln(1− r1T )]
do not converge to −∞.
Clearly (D.1) is stronger than both (D.2) and (22), but (D.2) does not
necessarily imply (22). Condition (D.1) holds, for example, if one of the
investors i = 2, ..., I uses the CAPM strategy (and so her relative market
share remains constant). Then, as Theorem 4 asserts, the difference between
the budget shares of investor 1 prescribed by the strategy λ∗ and the budget
shares prescribed by the CAPM decision rule converges a.s. to zero.
Appendix
A.1 Proofs of the Main Results
Theorem 2 is a direct consequence of Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. By using (8), we write
1− r1t+1
1− r1t
=
∑I
i=2 r
i
t+1
1− r1t
=
K∑
k=1
Rk(st+1, st)
(1− r1t )−1
∑I
i=2 λ
i
kr
i
t
qk,t
=
K∑
k=1
Rk(st+1, st)
ζk,t
qk,t
,
where
qk,t =
I∑
m=1
λmk r
m
t = λ
1
kr
1
t + (1− r1t )
∑I
i=2 λ
i
kr
i
t
1− r1t
= λ1kr
1
t + ζk,t(1− r1t ).
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Consequently,
1− r1t+1 =
K∑
k=1
Rk(st+1, st)
ζk,t(1− r1t )
λ1kr
1
t + ζk,t(1− r1t )
, (24)
and
r1t+1 =
K∑
k=1
Rk(st+1, st)
λ1kr
1
t
λ1kr
1
t + ζk,t(1− r1t )
. (25)
For each t = 1, 2, ..., consider the random variable
Dt = ln
r1t (r
1
t−1)
−1
(1− r1t )(1− r1t−1)−1
.
We have
D1 + ... + DT = ln
r1T
(1− r1T )
− ln r
1
0
(1− r10)
, (26)
Therefore, (19) holds if and only if
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
(D1 + ... + DT ) > 0 a.s.
By virtue of assumption (B), for every set of strategies (λik,t), i = 1, ..., I,
we consider, there exists a constant H such that (mini,k λik)
−1 ≤ H. For this
H, we have
H−1 ≤ r
i
t+1
rit
≤ H, i = 1, ..., I.
This implies
H−1 ≤ 1− r
1
t+1
1− r1t
≤ H
because 1 − r1t =
∑I
m=2 r
m
t . Consequently, the random variables Dt are
uniformly bounded.
We have the following identity
1
T
T∑
t=1
Dt =
1
T
T∑
t=1
E(Dt|st−1) + 1
T
T∑
t=1
[Dt − E(Dt|st−1)].
Since the random variables Dt are uniformly bounded, we can apply to the
process of martingale differences Bt := Dt − E(Dt|st−1) the strong law of
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large numbers (Hall and Heyde 1980, Theorem 2.19), which yields T−1(B1
+ ... +BT )→ 0 with probability 1. Thus, we have
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
Dt = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
E(Dt|st−1), (27)
and so (19) is equivalent to
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
E(Dt|st−1) > 0 a.s. (28)
By using (24), (25), we write
E[Dt|st−1] = E[ln r
1
t (r
1
t−1)
−1
(1− r1t )(1− r1t−1)−1
|st−1]
=
∑
σ∈S
p(σ|st−1) ln
∑
k
Rk(σ, st−1)
λ1k,t−1
λ1k,t−1r
1
t−1 + ζk,t−1(1− r1t−1)∑
k
Rk(σ, st−1)
ζk,t−1
λ1k,t−1r
1
t−1 + ζk,t−1(1− r1t−1)
, (29)
where
ζk,t−1 = ζk,t−1(st−1) =
∑I
i=2 λ
i
k,t−1r
i
t−1
1− r1t−1
, (30)
λik,t−1 = λ
i
k,t−1(s
t−1), rit−1 = r
i
t−1(s
t−1), (31)
λ1k,t−1 = λ
1
k,t−1(st−1) = R
∗
k(st−1).
Let us use Lemma 1 (see Section A.2 below) to estimate the expression
in (29). In view of this lemma, we have
E(Dt|st−1) ≥ δρ(|R∗(st−1)− ζt−1(st−1)|), (32)
where ρ is the strictly positive constant bounding away from zero the coordi-
nates of λit. Denote by N(T ) = N(T, s
T ) the set of those t ∈ [0, T ] for which
|R∗(st)− ζt(st)| ≥ κ. We have
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
E(Dt|st−1) ≥ lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
δρ(|R∗(st−1)− ζt−1(st−1)|)
≥ lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
δρ(|R∗(st)− ζt(st)|) ≥ lim inf
T→∞
1
T
∑
t∈N(T−1)
δρ(|R∗(st)− ζt(st)|)
≥ δρ(κ) · lim inf
T→∞
1
T
#{N(T − 1)} > 0,
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where the last inequality follows from (C.2). Thus we have established (28),
which is equivalent to (19).
Now, suppose that (19), and hence (28), hold. By virtue of Lemma 1, we
find
E(Dt|st−1) ≤ Lρ · |R∗(st−1)− ζt−1(st−1)|,
and so (28) yields
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
dt > 0 a.s., (33)
where dt = |R∗(st−1)− ζt−1(st−1)|.
Denote by κ¯ the strictly positive random variable which is equal a.s. to
the lim inf in (33) and set κ = κ¯/2. We claim that
lim inf
1
T
#
{
t ∈ {1, ..., T} : dt ≥ κ
}
> 0, (34)
which is equivalent to (C.2). Indeed, suppose the contrary. Then there is a
sequence Tk such that
1
Tk
#
{
t ∈ {1, ..., Tk} : dt ≥ κ
}→ 0. (35)
For each k denote by Mk (resp. Nk) the set of those t ∈ {1, Tk} for which
dt ≥ κ (resp. dt < κ). Then we have
1
Tk
Tk∑
t=1
dt =
1
Tk
∑
t∈Mk
dt +
1
Tk
∑
t∈Nk
dt ≤ 2 · 1
Tk
#(Mk) + κ (36)
because dt ≤ 2. According to (35), (Tk)−1 · #(Mk)→ 0. Consequently,
lim inf
1
Tk
Tk∑
t=1
dt ≤ κ < κ¯,
which contradicts the definition of κ¯. !
Proof of Theorem 4. Consider the nonnegative random variables vt =
δρ(|R∗(st−1) − ζt−1(st−1)|). By using (32), we write Evt ≤ E[E(Dt|st−1)] =
EDt, which yields, in view of (26),
T∑
t=1
Evt ≤ E ln r
1
1− r1T
+ C ≤ −E ln(1− r1T ) + C,
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where C is some constant. According to (D.1), the expectations−E ln(1−r1T )
do not converge to +∞. Therefore the non-negative sums Ev1 + ...+ EvT
are bounded by a constant C1. Consequently,
E lim
T→∞
T∑
t=0
vt = E lim
T→∞
inf
T∑
t=0
vt ≤ lim inf
T∑
t=0
Evt ≤ C1
by virtue of the Fatou lemma. Thus, we obtain
∑∞
t=0 vt < ∞ a.s., hence
vt → 0 a.s., and so |R∗(st−1)− ζt−1(st−1)|→ 0 a.s. !
A.2 An Auxiliary Result
Let S be a finite set, and, for each s ∈ S, let p(σ|s) (σ ∈ S) be a probability
distribution on S:
p(σ|s) ≥ 0,
∑
σ
p(σ|s) = 1.
For every σ ∈ S, let R(σ, s) = (R1(σ, s), ..., Rk(σ, s)) be a vector in the
simplex ∆K satisfying (A.1) and (A.2) for all s ∈ S.
Let ρ > 0 be a number such that R∗k(s) > ρ, s ∈ S (see (12)). Denote
by ∆K(ρ) the set of those vectors (b1, ..., bK) in ∆K that satisfy bk ≥ ρ,
k = 1, ..., K. Consider the function
Φ(s,κ, µ) =
∑
σ∈S
p(σ|s) ln
K∑
k=1
Rk(σ, s)
R∗k(s)
R∗k(s)κ+ (1− κ)µk
−
∑
σ∈S
p(σ|s) ln
K∑
k=1
Rk(σ, s)
µk
R∗k(s)κ+ (1− κ)µk
of s ∈ S, κ ∈ [0, 1] and µ = (µk) ∈ ∆K(ρ).
Lemma 1 There exists a constant Lρ and a function δρ(γ) ≥ 0 of γ ∈ [0,∞)
satisfying the following conditions:
(a) The function δ(·) is non-decreasing, and δρ(γ) > 0 for all γ > 0.
(b) For any s ∈ S, κ ∈ [0, 1] and µ = (µk) ∈ ∆K(ρ), we have
Lρ|R∗(s)− µ| ≥ Φ(s,κ, µ) ≥ δρ(|R∗(s)− µ|). (37)
Proof. It follows from (Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe´ 2001, Lemma
1) that, for all s ∈ S, κ ∈ [0, 1] and any µ ∈ ∆K+ , µ #= R∗(s), the value of
Φ(s,κ, µ) is strictly positive. Fix some γ0 > 0 for which the set W (s, γ) =
{µ ∈ ∆Kρ : |R∗(s)− µ| ≥ γ} is non-empty for all s ∈ S, γ ∈ [0, γ0] and define
δρ(s, γ) = inf{Φ(s,κ, µ) : κ ∈ [0, 1], µ ∈ W (s, γ)}
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if γ ∈ [0, γ0] and δρ(s, γ) = δρ(s, γ0) if γ > γ0. Since Φ(s,κ, µ) is continuous
and strictly positive on the compact set [0, 1]×W (s, γ) (γ > 0), the function
δρ(s, γ) takes on strictly positive values for γ > 0. Clearly this function
is non-decreasing in γ. Fix some s, consider any µ ∈ ∆Kρ and define γ =
|R∗(s)− µ|. Then we have µ ∈ W (s, γ), and so
Φ(s,κ, µ) ≥ δρ(s, γ) = δρ(s, |R∗(s)− µ|).
From this we can see that the sought-for function δρ(γ) can be defined as
δρ(γ) = min
s∈S
δρ(s, γ).
We can write Φ(s,κ, µ) = Φ(s,κ, µ)−Φ(s,κ, R∗k(s)) since the latter term
is zero. The function Φ(s,κ, µ) is differentiable in µ ∈ ∆K+ and its gradient
Φ′µ(s, ·, ·) is continuous, and hence bounded, on the compact set [0, 1]×∆Kρ .
This implies the existence of the Lipschitz constant Lρ in (37). !
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